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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5307
This paper assesses the impact of water supply variability 
on treaty cooperation between international bilateral 
river basin riparian states. Climate change is anticipated 
to change the variability of water supply, as well as its 
expected magnitude. Previous studies have focused 
mainly on water scarcity, measured in terms of mean 
precipitation or per capita water availability in the 
country, as a trigger for conflict or cooperation. The 
water variability measure used here captures both annual 
runoff variability and precipitation variability over 
periods of 30 and 100 years. The analysis used economic 
and international relations data to identify incentives 
This paper—a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in 
the department to mainstream research on climate change. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at bblankespoor@worldbank.org.  
for international cooperation in addressing water supply 
variability. The authors find that small-to-moderate 
increases in variability create an impetus for cooperation, 
although large increases in variability would reduce 
incentives for treaty cooperation. Stronger diplomatic 
and trade relations support cooperation, while uneven 
economic power inhibits cooperation. Various measures 
of democracy/governance suggest different impacts on 
cooperation across the basin riparians. The findings have 
policy implications in the context of preparedness for 
impacts of climate change on the water sector. 
The Impact of Water Supply Variability on Treaty Cooperation 
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1. Introduction 
Scientists are confident now that the “global average net effect of climate since 1750 has been 
one of warming” (IPCC, 2007:3), and that “[A]t continental, regional and ocean basin scales, 
numerous long-term changes in climate have been observed. These include changes in arctic 
temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns 
and aspects of extreme weather including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the 
intensity of tropical cyclones” (IPCC, 2007:7). 
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) suggests that “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from 
observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of 
snow and ice, and rising of global average sea levels.  The 100-year linear trend (1906-2005) of 
0.74 [0.56 to 0.92] °C is larger than the corresponding trend of 0.6 [0.4 to 0.8] °C (1901-2000) 
given in the Third Assessment Report” (IPCC, 2007:1-10). 
  These higher world temperatures are expected to increase the hydrological cycle activity, 
leading to a change in precipitation patterns and increase in evapotranspiration.  More 
specifically, climate change is expected to increase heat, reduce/increase precipitation, and also 
increase water supply variability both intra- and inter-annually. “There is high confidence that by 
mid-century, annual river runoff and water availability are projected to increase at high latitudes 
(and in some tropical wet areas) and decrease in some dry regions in the mid-latitudes and 
tropics.  There is also high confidence that many semi-arid areas (e.g. Mediterranean basin, 
western United States, southern Africa and northeast Brazil) will suffer a decrease in water 
resources due to climate change” (IPCC 2007b:8).  The Fourth Assessment Report further 
verifies the findings from the Third Assessment Report that states: “One major implication of 
climate change for agreements between competing users (within a region or upstream versus 
downstream) is that allocating rights in absolute terms may lead to further disputes in years to 
come when the total absolute amount of water available may be different.” (IPCC, 2001: Section 
4.7.3).   
  Some studies assert that climate change can lead to conflict between states who share 
international bodies of water following the likely dwindling water supplies (Gleditsch et al   
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2007).  On the other hand, several publications suggest that further exacerbation in the water 
situation may even open the door to new water allocation opportunities between these riparians 
(ESCAP 1997), and others (e.g., Dinar S., 2009 and the literature he cites) are more specific, 
suggesting that water scarcity is actually an impetus for cooperation, following a hill shaped 
relationship between scarcity and cooperation.   
  Several economic studies analyze, using a general framework, river sharing agreements 
with deterministic water flows (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002; Ambec and Ehlers 2008). The 
impact of different water availability levels on stability of cooperation is assessed, using different 
approaches. Beard and McDonald (2007) assess the consistency of water allocation agreements 
over time if negotiations are held periodically with known river flow prior to the negotiation. 
Janmatt and Ruijs (2007), in a stylized model of two regions, wet and arid, suggest that storage 
could mitigate water scarcity, if upstream and downstream riparian countries find a beneficial 
allocation to sustain it. They find that the collaboration potential is greater in arid than in wet 
regions, but that there is little scope for capturing the gains from basin level management if 
economic integration does not extend beyond water issues.  Another work (Ansink and Ruijs, 
2008) introduces the effects of climate change on both the efficiency and stability of water 
allocation agreements in international basins. Using a game theoretic framework it is shown that 
a decrease in mean flow of a river decreases the stability of an agreement while an increase in 
variance may have both positive and negative effects on treaty stability. 
Others introduce water supply variability into their analysis of specific case studies.   
Abbink et al. (2005) apply an experimental economics framework to the case of the Syr Darya 
(Aral Sea Basin) conflict in order to evaluate various governance structures and allocation rules 
needed for enhanced cooperation among Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan under several 
water supply regimes. The conclusion reached by Abbink et al. (2009) is that under the tested 
water availability values and the proposed payoff schemes, it is not likely that cooperation can be 
reached in that basin.  
Existing studies either address the impact of water scarcity on treaty cooperation, or the 
effects of water variability in the context of a very specific case study. Studies of international 
water cooperation focus mainly on water scarcity as a trigger for either conflict or cooperation 
(e.g., Dinar S. et al. 2007; Hamner 2008; Dinar S. 2009; Tir and Ackerman, 2009; Hensel and   
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Brochman 2009).  As such, various measures of water scarcity, mainly static ones, have been 
used to assess the emergence of international water treaties and levels of cooperation among 
riparians.  But in order to assess the likely impact of climate change on the stability of existing 
treaties and on the future likelihood of conflict and cooperation, one may need a water 
availability measure, such as increased water variability, that can better infer climate change 
impacts. 
Following a series of statements by world leaders in the popular press that worn us of 
looming wars over water due to increased water scarcity and climate change impact (e.g., BBC 
2003; Timesonline 2007), Barnaby has argued that: 
…it is still important that the popular myth of water wars somehow be dispelled 
once and for all.  This will not only stop unsettling and incorrect predictions of 
international conflict over water.  It will also discourage a certain public 
resignation that climate change will bring war, and focus attention instead on 
what politicians can do to avoid it.  …And it would help to convince that …the 
solutions to water scarcity and security lie outside the water sector in the 
water/food/trade/economic development nexus 
Barnaby (2009:283). 
It is, therefore, the Barnaby paper and the sometimes sensationalist water-wars 
statements, that make-up the general motivation for this paper—to strengthen the scientific basis 
to our understanding of water-climate change and cooperation/conflict interactions.   
In the proceeding sections we introduce water supply variability into a global analysis of 
treaty formation.  Building on existing theories (e.g., Ambec and Dinar A., 2009; Dinar S., 
2009), a global dataset of bilateral rivers will be used along with several water variability 
measures, to assess the likelihood of treaty formation, and treaty cooperation, using the range of 
climate during the years where existing treaties were signed.
i  In a second stage, using various 
future climate change predictions, the likelihood of additional treaty formation and cooperation 
is estimated. Section 2 reviews the scientific basis for the climate-hydrology relationship that 
affects the flow regime in river basins.  Section 3 develops the analytical framework.  Section 4 
reports the data sources and the construction of the various variables.  Section 5 discusses the   
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hypotheses.  Section 6 presents the empirical models. The results are presented in Section 7, and 
the paper concludes in Section 8 with suggested policy implications. 
2. Climate, Hydrology, and Flow Regimes in Rivers 
The hydrology of river basins is affected by changes in climatic conditions.  Anthropogenic-
induced climate change is expected to influence water resource cycles significantly.  However, 
the stochastic nature of the changes in the water cycle is uncertain.  A useful explanation of the 
interaction between climate change and the hydrological cycle can be found in Miller and Yates 
(2005).  They suggest that global climate change is expected to alter the hydrologic cycle by 
affecting the amount, intensity, and temporal distribution of precipitation.  Warmer temperatures 
will affect the amount of winter precipitation in the form of rain or snow, the amount stored as 
snow and ice, and its melting dynamics.  Long-term climatic trends could trigger vegetation 
changes that would alter a region’s water balance.  In forest areas, the combination of warmer 
temperatures and drying soils caused by snow melting earlier than usual or longer droughts can 
lead to more frequent and extensive wildfires.  When this occurs, land cover and watershed 
runoff characteristics may change quickly and dramatically as wildfires reduce forest cover and 
thereby affect the runoff response.  Less dramatic, but equally important, changes in runoff can 
affect transpiration of plants, altered by changes in soil moisture availability, as well as plant 
responses to elevated CO2 concentrations.  In addition, changes in the quantity and quality of 
water percolating to groundwater will result in changes in aquifer levels and quality, in base 
flows entering surface streams, and in seepage losses from surface water bodies to the 
groundwater system (Miller and Yates 2005:37). 
  A comprehensive assessment of available water hydrology-climate studies from around 
the world is provided in IPCC (1996a, b) and IPCC (2001). The findings in IPCC (2001:Section 
4.3.6.1) suggest that: 
  “In general, the patterns found are consistent with those identified for 
precipitation: Runoff tends to increase where precipitation has increased and 
decrease where it has fallen over the past few years. Flows have increased in 
recent years in many parts of the United States, for example, with the greatest 
increases in low flows …[]. Variations in flow from year to year have been found   
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to be much more strongly related to precipitation changes than to temperature 
changes …[]. There are some more subtle patterns, however. In large parts of 
eastern Europe, European Russia, central Canada …[], and California …[], a 
major—and unprecedented—shift in stream flow from spring to winter has been 
associated not only with a change in precipitation totals but more particularly 
with a rise in temperature: Precipitation has fallen as rain, rather than snow, and 
therefore has reached rivers more rapidly than before. In cold regions, such as 
northern Siberia and northern Canada, a recent increase in temperature has had 
little effect on flow timing because precipitation continues to fall as snow …[].”   
IPCC (2001:Section 4.3.6.1) 
However, the IPCC (2001:Section 4.3.6.1) concludes that: 
 “…it is very difficult to identify trends in the available hydrological data, for 
several reasons. Records tend to be short, and many data sets come from 
catchments with a long history of human intervention. Variability over time in 
hydrological behavior is very high, particularly in drier environments, and 
detection of any signal is difficult. Variability arising from low-frequency climatic 
rhythms is increasingly recognized, and researchers looking for trends need to 
correct for these patterns. Finally, land-use and other changes are continuing in 
many catchments, with effects that may outweigh any climatic trends.” 
(2001:Section 4.3.6.1) 
  Specifically, not all river basins are affected by climate in the same way.  Differences 
have been observed both within a given country or even a state. (Miller, Bashford and Strem 
(2006), for example, study 6 basins in Central-Northern California.  While the trend of the 
impact of the various future climate scenarios on the 6 water systems is similar, it is evident that 
the six basins are different in their level of sensitivity to the same expected changes in 
temperature and precipitation.   
  A comparison between 5 international river basins (the Nile, Zambezi, Indus, Mekong, 
and Uruguay) in Riebsame et al. (2002) suggests that basins in drier regions (e.g., Nile, Zambezi)   
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would be most hydrologically-sensitive to the climate change scenarios that were used in the 
simulation.  Hydrological sensitivity of the Indus and Uruguay basins is described as moderate 
and that of the Mekong is described as low.  The adaptation scenarios that have been considered 
in the basins include mainly investment in larger storage, and adjustments to allocation regimes.  
However, because these two adaptation interventions are associated with transboundary property 
rights, the authors correctly identify that climate change could likely lead to either cooperation or 
conflict among the basin riparians. 
Using simulations, Arora and Boer (2001) analyzed twenty three basins, among them 
twelve that are international.  Applying one climate change scenario they simulated future mean 
annual discharges and mean annual floods in 2100.  Findings suggest that rivers in middle to 
high latitude are expected to face between +67 and -16 percent change in mean annual discharge 
and between +68 and -28 percent change in mean annual flood.  On the other hand, rivers in 
tropical and low latitudes are expected to face between +5 and -79 percent change in mean 
annual discharge and between +26 and -74 percent change in mean annual flow.  These findings 
necessitate a serious consideration of water management adaptation, including a possible 
adjustment of infrastructure.  A recent global study (Palmer et al. 2008) evaluated the future 
(2050, A2 Scenario) impact of climate change on the discharge of major dammed rivers.  The 
findings are in agreement with Arora and Boer (2001), but much more comprehensive in 
coverage.  They then evaluate a set of river basin management strategies (Bernhardt et al. 2005) 
to propose a range of interventions that may mitigate future impact of climate change and man-
made development on river flow. 
Similar findings are suggested by Milly et al (2005), namely an increase of runoff (10-40 
percent) by 2050 in high latitude basins in North America and Europe, and in certain low latitude 
basins such as the La Plata and basins in western Africa.  A decrease in runoff between 10 to 30 
percent is expected in basins in southern Europe, the Middle East, and basins in mid-latitude 
western regions of North America and southern Africa. 
Climate change is said to affect future river flows by increasing intra and inter-annual 
variability, and in certain locations to reduce annual means.  However, historical records of many 
river basin flows suggest that significant variability and trends in mean flows have already been 
observed (Arora et al, 2001; Milly et al. 2005; Palmer et al., 2008; Dinar A., 2009).  This means   
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more ‘below average’ and more ‘above average’ precipitation and flow (runoff), which is hard to 
cope with by riparians that are tied to a given water allocation scheme and existing infrastructure 
that was designed for a given long-term water flow level. We argue that the various basins in our 
dataset have already experienced changes in water supply variability (flow, precipitation).  Thus, 
a first stage of analyzing the impact of climate change on the stability of intentional water 
agreements should focus on observing likely effects of past climate changes on past treaty 
cooperation.  If we can show that water supply variability has affected treaty cooperation in the 
past 150 years, we would expect that further increase in water supply variability would have 
similar, or even magnified, effects on treaty cooperation.  Therefore, by studying the past 
changes in climate we will be able to extrapolate predictions how future climates may affect 
future treaty cooperation. The next section develops the theoretical framework with which we 
will estimate the impact of change in climate on the likelihood of cooperation among 
international bilateral river basin riparians. 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
Pairs of countries sign treaties over water bodies they share for various reasons.  The economics 
and international relations literature suggest that they do it because they either face difficulties 
they cannot overcome themselves; or that they anticipate externalities relating to pollution, flood 
control, or hydropower, (Just and Netanyahu, 1998); or for reasons such as economies of scale 
where parties anticipate being better off acting in a coalition rather than acting alone when facing 
certain water scarcity situations (Dinar S., 2009).   
The economics and international relations literature that applies statistical tools to 
international water datasets (Brochmann and Hensel, 2009; Espey and Towfique, 2004; 
Gleditsch et al., 2006; Hensel et al., 2006; Song and Whittington, 2004; Tir and Ackerman, 
2009; Toset et al., 2000; Dinar S., 2009) has gone a long way already in developing a theory that 
explains various aspects of shared water and environmental treaty making and we adopt a 
number of these general variables in our study.   
Water variability and cooperation 
Overall scarcity (or water availability) has become an important explanatory variable in some of 
these statistical studies. In particular, Dinar, S. 2009 hypothesizes an inverted U-shaped curve   
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between levels of treaty cooperation and water scarcity.  When water is not scarce (abundant) 
riparian states are in less need to cooperate because they boast a sufficient level of water; as 
scarcity level increases the impetus for cooperation increases.  But as water becomes extremely 
scarce, there is very little to cooperate over and thus formalized treaty formation becomes less 
likely (Dinar S. 2009, and the literature he cites).  
We believe a similar curvilinear relationship may be made in relation to water variability, 
as the low end of the distribution (low variability) is associated with lower damages and the high 
end of the distribution (high variability) is associated with significant damages (from droughts 
and floods, respectively). Consequently, riparians in these situations are hypothesized to exhibit 
less incidence of cooperation. Cooperation can be reflected in signing new treaties in cases 
where they do not exist; in more treaties to amend the initial set of agreements; or in new treaties 
introducing more issues (such as water quantity, hydropower, pollution, and flood control) into 
the cooperative framework.  We use two climatic variables that affect water scarcity, namely 
basin-level precipitation variability and basin-level runoff variability. 
  An empirical observation of the mean versus the variability of both precipitation and 
runoff further strengthens our claim.  We find in our data that higher variation is correlated with 
lower means (R
2=-0.197 and R
2=-0.208 for basin precipitation and for basin runoff, 
respectively).  A similar finding was found in the case of long-term rainfall means and variability 
in 42 Sub Saharan Countries (Dinar and Keck, 2000). 
Democracy and governance 
Past studies have concluded that democratic dyads, relative to dyads with at least one non-
democracy, are more likely to demonstrate higher international environmental commitment in 
general and sign international water agreements in particular (Neumayer 2002a; Tir and 
Ackerman 2009).   
In particular, domestic institutions may play a major role in either facilitating or 
inhibiting international cooperation. Political, legal, and economic institutions sustain the 
functioning of the state both domestically and internationally. They reflect the state’s ability to 
enter into, and honor, an agreement, which may require financial investments and costs 
(Congleton, 1992:412-413). Countries that are more institutionally advanced may in turn have   
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little interest in cooperative ventures with countries having weaker and unstable institutions. 
Similarly, investments are not secure and property rights poorly defined in unstable countries 
characterized by political turmoil (Deacon, 1994). It is hypothesized therefore that the higher the 
level of institutionalization and governance (e.g., an effective domestic government) among the 
riparians, the more a water agreement is likely to be facilitated. 
Trade and overall country relations 
The literature has also considered other interactions such as trade and the extent of diplomatic 
ties among the states as additional variables for explaining the emergence or failure of treaty 
cooperation. By some accounts the more countries trade the higher the level of their 
interdependence and the higher the likelihood of treaty formation (Polachek 1980, 1987). 
Janmatt and Ruijs (2007) argue that there is little scope for capturing the gains from basin level 
management if economic integration does not extend beyond water issues. A history of 
diplomatic ties and good relations are, therefore, expected to express overall good country 
relations and increase treaty likelihood (Yoffe et. al. 2003).   
Power asymmetries 
The international relations literature has entertained power asymmetry as possibly facilitating 
cooperation (Lowi 1993). Other works have argued that power asymmetry is not necessarily a 
pre-requisite for cooperation although if asymmetry does exist the hegemon often plays a benign 
role by facilitating inter-state coordination through incentives (Young 1994; Barrett 2003). 
Consequently, while brute power may not be relevant for analyzing inter-state cooperation in the 
case of the environment, the different abilities of countries to provide such incentives as financial 
transfers or side-payments may be important. Other studies (Just and Netanyahu, 1998:9; Hijri 
and Grey, 1998: 89) claim that power asymmetries generally impede cooperation. First, a power 
balance may reflect a type of equality in the sense that a weaker party does not believe it will be 
taken advantage of by the stronger party, reducing trust issues (Rubin and Brown, 1975:213-
233). Second, the more powerful state does not fill obliged to provide costly incentives to 
encourage the weaker state to cooperate (Bennett, Ragland and Yolles, 1998:63-66).   Our 
economic power variable, measuring the ratio between the more economically powerful and the 
less powerful riparian is hypothesized to negatively affect treaty cooperation.   
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Geography 
Certain riverine geographical configurations have been said to facilitate conflict while other have 
been said to be more conducive to cooperation. The literature has argued that the more 
asymmetric the river geography the harder it is to achieve cooperation (LeMarquand 1977; 
Haftendorn 2000). This is notoriously most common in upstream-downstream situations. In 
opposition, the more symmetric the river geography (i.e. the more retaliation is internalized to 
the river system), the less feasible conflict becomes.  In other words, the more the river straddles 
the international boundary the more conducive such a typology may be for inter-state 
coordination over the river (Toset et. al 2000).  
4. Data and Variables 
Based on the literature reviewed earlier, we divide our data construction efforts into two parts.  
We focus first on data and variables that represent water supply variability in a basin.    At a 
second stage we discuss the data and variables that represent the international relations, 
economic, political and institutional situation in the basin countries, and the basin geography. 
Data on climate and water variability 
Basin maps 
A list of 224 bilateral basins is adopted from Dinar, S. (2008) (See Map 1).  The Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) provided geo-referenced basins for almost all the 
international river basins (http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/). Since some of 
the bilateral basins are sub-basins of TFDD basins, or are not included in the TFDD, it was 
necessary to delineate the catchments for the unit of analysis—the treaty basin.  When both 
datasets matched, we selected the TFDD basin delineation.  Otherwise the remaining basins were 
identified using ancillary data sources (See Appendix 3).  For these remaining basins, 
hydrologically conditioned elevation datasets (HydroSHEDS) are used to determine the flow 
paths and watershed boundaries.
ii  Ancillary data sources provide location information to identify 
the mouth of the given river.  With this geo-referenced point and HydroSHEDS data, we used 
Environmental Systems Research Institute ArcGIS software to delineate the catchment via a two-
step process: first, adjusting the mouth location to the nearest center point of the 30 arc-second 
flow accumulation grid in HydroSHEDS and, second, employing the watershed function in   
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ArcGIS to delineate the catchment.  For example, Map 2 shows the basin shared by Turkey and 
Iran. In a few cases, the publicly available data on river mouth locations were insufficient and 
experts from the region were consulted to verify the locations (e.g., AL-Jabbari, 2009).  
Runoff data by basin and country-basin 
The Global Runoff Data Center (GRDC) provided flow data for stations within international 
river basins (http://www.bafg.de/GRDC/EN/Home/homepage__node.html).  The distribution of the 
GRDC data availability is not uniform across the world.  Also, the temporal distribution varies 
widely.  With additional data requirements such as 12 monthly observations per year and at least 
5 years of observations, we ended up with 98 basin observations only (compared with the 224 
basins in our dataset).  Therefore, we could not use the GRDC data.   
We turned to another alternative. Monthly runoff data over a thirty year period (1961-
1990) was taken from a stand-alone hydrologic model CLIRUN-II (Strzepek et al., 2008) that is 
designed for application in water resource projects and generates global output at a 0.5 x 0.5 
degree grid scale.  The basin runoff is the sum of the area-weighted runoff from the grids within 
the basin. The flows are calculated for three values per basin: for the entire basin and for the area 
of the basin in each riparian country (country-basin).  For the country-basin level, international 
boundaries from the World Bank (2009) are used and intersected with the river basin boundaries. 
Then, similar to the country-basin level runoff, the basin runoff is the sum of the area-weighted 
runoff from the grids with the treaty basin Runoff values expressed in units of m³/s.   The annual 
Coefficient of Variation (CV) is calculated to measure runoff variance. 
To verify the values produced by the global stand-alone hydrologic model CLIRUN-II 
(Strzepek et al., 2008), we calculated their correlation with the runoff data that is recorded by the 
Global Runoff Data Center for various (98) world rivers and runoff estimates provided by the 
GRDC-UNH Composite Runoff Fields V1.0 (Fekete et al., 2000).  We found that the correlation 
between the GRDC-based flow data and the CLIRUN-II based data for the same 98 basins was 
R
2=0.846. This correlation gives us confidence in the data we calculated from the stand alone 
hydrological model so that we can use the remaining 126 observations for which actual flow data 
is not available in the GRDC dataset. Then, comparing the two model results using the Pearson 
method, the correlation statistic between the mean annual runoff of CLIRUN-II and UNH-  
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GRDC Composite Runoff Fields V1.0 is 0.97 with 222 pair-wise complete observations out of 
224 total. We tested also for the possibility of a basin area effect where small basins may have 
good correlation due to more concentration of gauging stations.  We found the basin area 
variable is not significant. This result gives us confidence that the CLIRUN-II model results are 
reasonable and have the added advantage of a time-series for this analysis. 
Precipitation data 
Precipitation data are available from Mitchell and Jones (2005) from the Climate Research Unit 
(CRU) and downloaded from the CGIAR website.
iii These global data are a time-series from 
1900-2000 at 0.5 grid.  Mean precipitation is summarized by basin and by country-basin 
separately.  The same procedure, as in the case of runoff, was used to calculate precipitation of 
basin and country-basin annual means and Coefficient of Variation (CV). The aggregated data 
are provided by running the algorithm for both the basin-country-polygons and the basin 
polygons.  Precipitation is expressed in units of millimeters per year.  
Water variability variables 
We were able to construct several sets of water variability variables for precipitation and for 
runoff.  While our data allows calculation of precipitation at country-basin and at basin levels, 
the runoff variables could be calculated only at basin level. Technically, it is possible given the 
caveat that the country-basin will further split up the total area and will likely lessen the number 
of model observation(s) per basin-country. This reduction in observations gives room to a larger 
potential error and a lesser likelihood of actual gauge station observations in the basin for the 
model. We constructed the following variables: Mean precipitation for country1/basinj 
(MeanPb1); Mean precipitation for country2/basinj (MeanPb2); Mean precipitation for basinj 
(MeanPb); Coefficient of Variation of precipitation country1/basinj (CVPb1); Coefficient of 
Variation of precipitation country2/basinj (CVPb2); Coefficient of Variation of precipitation 
basinj (CVPb); Mean runoff for basinj (MeanRb); Coefficient of Variation of runoff basinj 
(CVRb).  
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Data on economic, political and international relations 
We use several sources to construct our economic, political, geography, and international 
relations variables.  We will explain the processes we used in order to calculate each of these 
variables in the context of a basin/country or in the context of a basin (containing the area of the 
basin for the two riparians). 
Democracy and governance 
We employ 4 variables that measure level of democracy and governance in a country, using data 
from Neumayer (2002a:145-146).  The variables include a combined index of political rights and 
civil liberties, a combined index of democracy and autocracy, Vanhanen’s index of democracy, 
and a combined governance indicator, based on seven other indicators that measure governance 
quality. Three of the democracy/governance variables also have a dummy version. The variables 
are (1) a combined index of political rights and civil liberties (Freedind); a combined index of 
democracy and autocracy (Politind); Vanhanen’s index of democracy (Autodemo); and a 
combined governance indicator, based on seven other indicators that measure governance quality 
(Voiceind).  Three of these variables also have a dummy (0-1) version (Freeddum, Politdum, 
Voicedum).  The exact definition of the democracy variables can be found in Neumayer (2002a). 
Variables in the democracy and governance categories are expressed as indexes or as 
dummies and are calculated for each country in the basin. We expect that some of the democracy 
variables and the governance variables are correlated somehow due to the nature of the 
specification of several of the democracy variable (political rights and civil liberties; governance 
quality). Therefore, we will not use democracy and governance as independent variables in the 
same equation.   
Trade and diplomatic ties 
These variables pertain to two riparian states in each basin and thus they are calculated as basin-
level variables.    
15 
Trade 
We obtained two separate trade datasets. The first is the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
Database IMFDOT that includes trade information for 184 countries for the period 1950-2004, in 
current US$. The second dataset is the United Nations Statistics Department (UNSD) dataset 
COMTRADE that includes information for 207 countries for the period 1962-2004 in current 
US$. Sources of data feeding into the IMFDOT and into the COMTRADE datasets are different 
and as such, differences in annual trade values can be expected. Such differences have been 
observed (IMF, 1999: Table 2), although differences do not exceed 10%. We constructed 
separate trade variables based on both the IMF and UN datasets. We converted the trade values 
in these two datasets into constant 1999 US$ (for IMFDOT) and 2002 US$ (for COMTRADE). 
We then use annual country-level GDP data from the GGDC&CB (2005) dataset, which is 
expressed in 1999 (for IMFDOT) and 2002 (for COMTRADE) US$ to construct our trade 
variables, using 2000 as the base year. Missing trade values in particular years were ignored 
because our trade variables are calculated as long term averages.  
The following definitions apply for the two trade variables:  Let i=1 and i=2 be two 
riparian states sharing a river. Let  t IMP 12  be import of 1 from 2 in year t, [=  t EXP 21 ]; let  t EXP 12  
be export of 1 to 2 in year t, [=  t IMP 21 ]; let  wt IMP 1  be import of 1 from w in year t; let  wt IMP 2  be 
import of 2 from w in year t; let  wt EXP 1  be export of 1 to w in year t; let  wt EXP 2  be export of 2 to 
w in year t; let  t GDP 1  be gross domestic product of country 1 in year t; and let  t GDP 2  be gross 
domestic product of country 2 in year t; and w be rest of the world (not including 1 and 2). 
We first constructed two annual trade variables for each trade dataset. The first variable 
(TRD1) expresses total trade between 1 and 2 as a fraction of the countries’ GDP, expressing the 
economic importance of trade to the riparians (Sigman 2004). The second variable (TRD2) 
measures trade between 1 and 2 as a fraction of their trade with the rest of the world, expressing 
their dependence on each other (Reuveny and Kang 1996). The two trade variables that we apply 
to the two trade data sets are presented in equations (1) and (2).    
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where,  t t EXP IMP 12 12   is the total annual volume of trade between every two countries 1 and 2. 
Both TRD1 and TRD2 are fractions, with  1 2 , 1 0   TRD TRD . We will refer to TRD1 as Trade 
importance and to TRD2 as Trade dependency. We found that TRD1(IMF) and TRD1(UN) are 
highly correlated (R
2=1.000) and TRD2(IMF) and TRD2(UN) are also highly correlated 
(R
2=0.999). Therefore, we can use one of the datasets only.  Since the IMF dataset includes more 
basins than the UN dataset, for the purpose of this paper only the IMF dataset is used.  Since 
TRD1(IMF) and TRD2(IMF) are highly correlated (R
2=0.599) we selected TRD1UN) - Trade 
importance to be the variable we use in our regressions. 
Since our unit of observation is the river, we construct the trade variable for the entire 
dyad. As was indicated in our analytical framework, one riparian may be more interested in 
signing a treaty than the other. However, the outcome (as we measure it) doesn’t reveal which 
riparian initiated the water treaty and, thus, our trade variables measure the dyadic trade volume 
rather than that of each riparian state. 
Diplomatic Relations 
We use the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Diplomatic Exchange (v2006.1)) for the 
construction of the Diplomatic relations variable. Data on diplomatic relations is available for the 
period 1817-2005. We capture whether either riparian had representation in the other country in 
a given year. In this case we assigned a value of 1 to this year. Diplomatic relations is then 
calculated by dividing the number of years for which any representation was recorded by the 
total number of years for which data is available. The resulting variable, Diplomatic relations, is 
then bounded between [0, 1].   
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Power asymmetries 
To reflect the economic and welfare asymmetry discussed above, we use annual country-level 
GDP data (state level data) from the GGDC&CB (2005) dataset, and Population Action 
International (2004) data to calculate GDP and GDP per capita for each of the basin riparians.
iv 
The ratio between the values of the riparians is the basis for the power asymmetry in the basin. 
The former is a measure of overall power (Economic power) while the latter is a measure of 
wealth (Welfare power).  The two variables were constructed by dividing the value of the 
wealthier, or the more economically powerful riparian by the value of the less powerful riparian.  
Therefore, the value is always greater or equal to 1; the higher the value, the greater the power 
asymmetry. In our analysis we use only the variable Economic power per the justification 
provided in the theory section. 
Geography 
We use the 14 geographical configurations identified in Dinar S., (2008).  These configurations 
were re-categorized into three groups, capturing the rivers that fall under the ‘through-border’ 
geography—or the most asymmetric of the river geographies—and the rivers that fall under the 
‘border-creator’ geography—or the most symmetric of the river geographies. The remaining 
rivers that fall under the other configurations were included under ‘other’ geography, whereby 
this category served as the benchmark. The reasons for this regrouping are as follows: (1) the 
distorted distribution of the 14 categories doesn’t allow the estimated regression model to be 
fully ranked, and (2) we are mostly interested in the impact of the two extreme geographies and 
their ability to explain interactions between riparian states. In fact, all the other geographies have 
some combination of spatial asymmetry and symmetry so ranking them would be quite 
impossible.   
Treaty data 
The treaty dataset is retrieved from several depositories and includes 226 country dyad 
observations.
v  Eighty-six of the corresponding rivers are not governed by treaties while 140 are, 
providing a diverse pool of observations to examine the hypotheses. Three hundred and eleven 
treaties were identified and analyzed for their content. Of these, 40 provide only periodical re-  
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affirmation of previous treaties and do not introduce new agreements. These treaties were 
removed from the analysis, leaving the dataset with 271 treaties.  
Treaty cooperation variables are described in our analysis as: (1) Treaty/no-treaty, a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not there is (are) an existing treaty (treaties)—1, or 
not—0, addressing any issue or several issues; and (2) Number of treaties signed between the 
river riparians (an integer ranging between 0-N that measures the number of treaties on that 
river).   
5. Empirical Framework 
The underlying empirical assumption in our analytical framework is that water variability is 
embedded in the basin history and may increase in the future.  Past water variability, as well as 
concerns regarding future variability of water, affect regional relationships.  For example, 
although some disasters caused by floods or droughts
vi may encourage states to engage in joint 
mitigation efforts, we claim that it is the long-term variability that leads to enduring cooperation, 
codified in an agreement, between river riparians. 
Based on the theory developed above, long-term cooperation among riparian states can 
be expressed by the following relationship 
) ; ( X V f C  .   (3) 
That is, cooperation, measured through treaty relations, is a function of a vector of water 
supply variability (V ) and of other variables (X ). The vector X  includes democracy and 
governance variables, the states’ overall relations (including diplomatic ties, and trade), variables 
measuring power asymmetry, and physical geographical setting.  In the next section we provide 
several alternative empirical specifications for level of cooperation and for water supply 
variability. 
Applying the framework 
We analyze bilateral river basins.  The unit of observation in our analytical framework is the 
river (Treaties are signed sometimes for certain tributaries rather for the entire basin). 
Cooperation between the two riparian states takes place if a treaty (or treaties) exist(s).  Some of 
the earlier treaties in our database may no longer be in force for a variety of reasons. However,   
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because our approach considers water variability as a long-term phenomenon and since we argue 
that agreements are a response to such variability we are interested in all treaty observations 
throughout time.  We assume that while water-related issues among the riparians are interrelated 
and their resolution may affect each other, all are basically driven by water variability. 
Measuring treaty cooperation 
Two proposed expressions for C will be based on a cooperation relationship explaining treaty 
formation. Our first cooperation expression, P(C) in (4), assesses the likelihood of a treaty on 
any of the issues in the basin, regardless of the issue, the riparian state that faces water 
variability, or the period the treaty was signed.  




exist treaty no if
issue any on exists treaty one least at if
C P
0
1
) (  (4) 
A second cooperation expression, N(C) in (5), is a simple arithmetic count of the number 
of treaties signed between the two riparian states on any issue or issues over the years.  We 
acknowledge that cooperation may have aspects other than the nominal count of treaties 
existence or number of treaties. The reader is referred to the justification of using number of 
treaties to Dinar S. (2009). 
T t for T C N
t
t ,..., 1 , ) (      (5) 
where Tt is the number of treaties in year t.  We apply the model in (5) to the set that includes all 
rivers without and with treaties (0, 1, 2, …, N). 
 
Empirical specifications, functional forms and estimation issues 
The empirical specifications of the various expressions to be estimated are as follows: 
Treaty/no-treaty =f1(.) 
Number of treaties =f2(.) 
The expression (.) includes a subset of the following independent variables: CV Basin 
Precipitation, CV Basin Precipitation Squared, (or CV Basin Runoff, CV Basin Runoff Squared), 
State democracy and governance variables,  Through-border dummy,  Border-creator dummy   
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(with all other geographies lumped together and serving as the benchmark), Trade importance, 
Diplomatic relations, Economic power.
vii   
The rationale for the various regressions and estimation procedures are as follows. In 
cases where the dependent variable is a dichotomous choice (1/0), we employ a maximum-
likelihood logit model. The function guarantees probabilities in the [0,1] range. The logit form 
also gives a plausible shape for the marginal effects. That is, for a continuous variable Xk, at 
relatively high values, a marginal change will create a relatively smaller change in the 
probability of success (Y=1). In some cases, we also rely on a generalized linear model (GLM) 
procedure, which fits models, using Newton-Raphson (maximum likelihood) optimization. The 
GLM procedure is preferred over a conventional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach when 
the dependent variable of interest may have a non-continuous distribution (such as ranking), and 
thus, the predicted values should also follow the respective distribution. Any other predicted 
values are not logically possible, as the effect of the predictors on the dependent variable may 
not be linear. The Generalized Linear Model is used to predict responses both for dependent 
variables with discrete distributions and for dependent variables which are nonlinearly related to 
the predictors. We also use a POISSON procedure in the case of the full data set to capture the 
non-continuous distribution of the dependent variable. The results are presented with indication 
of the data sets to which they refer.  
To sum, our general basin-level treaty cooperation model takes the form: 
 

) Re , ,
, , , , var (
lations Diplomatic s asymmetrie Power Trade
Gegraphy Democracy Governance iability Water h n Cooperatio Treaty Water
 (6) 
where    is the error term and each variable is represented by the various measurements 
discussed above. 
  We cannot avoid addressing possible endogeneity related to modeling the relationship 
between trade and cooperation (Timpone, 2003). One concern is that both trade and cooperation, 
among the river basin riparians, might be endogenously determined in an interdependent 
relationship and thus, if specified in a single equation, may lead to a biased estimation. By 
considering trade as a long term activity among the riparians, our theory suggests that trade is 
determined outside of the model and is uncorrelated with the error term of the equation. 
Therefore, we can use trade as an independent variable in our single model estimates.   
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6. Results 
We applied the analytical framework in the case of two climatic phenomena, namely basin 
variability of precipitation and basin variability of runoff.  Descriptive statistics of the variables 
discussed and used in the paper are presented in Appendix 2. 
We report separately the results for the basin precipitation variability and for the basin 
runoff variability.  One important caveat we should address upfront is that our analysis at this 
stage doesn’t account for water regulation in the rivers in our sample.  While the IPCC 
(2001:Section 4.3.6.1) suggests that “…Runoff tends to increase where precipitation has 
increased and decrease where it has fallen over the past few years,” it is important to note that 
dams may skew the runoff pattern.  However, we found an empirically positive correlation 
(R
2=0.280) between mean basin precipitation and mean basin runoff in the 215 basins we could 
compare; and a higher positive correlation between the coefficient of variation of basin 
precipitation and runoff (R
2=0.729). Another interesting finding is the high correlation 
(R
2=0.927) between the mean country-basin precipitation values (MeanPb1 and MeanPb2).  The 
country-basin precipitation variation values (CVPb1 and CVPb2) were also found to be highly 
correlated (R
2=0.860) among the two riparians.  Therefore, we will use only the basin level 
variable CVPb.  This high correlation suggests that even in very large river basins in our sample, 
the climate characteristics are similar across the basin territories of the two riparians. Another 
explanation is that the model data was created from limited meteorological / runoff observations 
in certain geographic areas (e.g. Africa) and does not have high variance.    
Basin precipitation and runoff estimates 
We first present results of an analysis that estimated whether or not the basin precipitation 
variability itself and basin runoff itself can explain cooperation.  Table 1 contains 3 equations. 
Equation (1) includes the basin precipitation variation while equations (2) and (3) include the 
basin runoff variation.  The results indicate that basin precipitation variability (CVPb) and basin 
runoff variability (CVRb) explain the variance in the level of treaty cooperation across the 
analyzed basins, with a fitness of fit tests that are significant at a 5 percent level and better.  The 
results confirm as well the inverted U-shape of the relationship between water variability and 
treaty cooperation. The finding are encouraging, but, taking the logit Pseudo R
2 of 0.044 as an 
indication, suggests that precipitation and runoff variability alone cannot fully explain   
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cooperation.  Using the same argument (while in the case of the GLM estimates ((1) and (3)), the 
Maddala R
2 is 0.284 and 0.295 respectively) we will improve the overall explanation of the 
GLM estimates by adding several control variables.  Tables 2 and 3 introduce control variables 
that improve the level of explanation while keeping the significance of the results intact.
viii 
  Table 2 presents the results of the Logistic runs, estimating the likelihood of forming a 
treaty.  Equations (1)-(3) pertain to the precipitation variability where as equations (4)-(6) pertain 
to the runoff variability.  The estimates of the precipitation variables suggest that it affects the 
likelihood of forming a treaty in a U-shaped pattern.  The coefficients of the basin precipitation 
variables were found significant at a 10 percent level while the coefficients of the basin runoff 
variables were found significant at 5 percent to 10 percent in 2 equations and not significant in 
equation (6).  Moving to the democracy and governance variables the Freedom variables yielded 
the best results in terms of significance level, across the two climate variables—precipitation and 
runoff. The other variables used, Voice and Polity of each of the riparian states provide 
consistent signs, but not always significant coefficients.  The two dummy geography variables 
were not significant in this table.  The trade variables are highly significant across all 6 equations 
and with the expected sign, suggesting that as in the case of the climate variables (precipitation 
and runoff), trade has an inverted U-shape effect on treaty cooperation.  Diplomatic relations 
have positive and significant coefficients in all but one equation, suggesting that higher levels of 
the diplomatic engagement between the countries lead to increased likelihood for treaty 
cooperation. The Economic power variable has negative and significant coefficients, suggesting 
that power asymmetry in the basin would work against treaty cooperation.  All 6 regressions 
yield stable estimates with Log Pseudo Likelihood that ranges between -58.89 and -60.45.  The 
Wald χ2 values are significant at a level of 1 percent and better.  The Pseudo R2 values are 
around 0.25 and much improved compared to Table 1. 
Table 3 presents the results of the GLM and POISSON regressions, where the treaty 
cooperation is estimated using the number of treaties (including no treaties) as the dependent 
variable.  A total of 8 equations are presented. Equations (1)-(4) use precipitation and equations 
(5)-(8) use runoff as the climate variables.  The climate coefficients perform as expected in terms 
of sign and significance level, but the estimated coefficients in the runoff equations are more 
significant than those in the precipitation equation.  The polity variables (both the Polity Dummy 
and the Polity Index) perform also as expected in terms of sign and significance level.  They are   
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also stable across the eight estimated equations. The Freedom Index variable did not perform 
well in the estimates in this table.  The trade variables have the expected sign and are significant 
in all estimates.  The Diplomatic Relations variable has the expected signs in all eight equations.  
However, it is significant in all regressions with precipitation ((1)-(4)), and only in two ((6), (8)) 
of the four equations with runoff.  The Economic Power coefficient is both significant and has 
the expected sign in all 8 equations.  In terms of overall equation fit, the GLM estimates ((1), (2), 
(5), (6)) have a Maddala R
2 in the range of 0.32-0.37.  And the POISON estimates ((3), (4), (7), 
(8)) have a Pseudo R
2 in the range of 0.13-0.19, with Wald χ2 values suggesting a significance at 
1 percent and higher. 
  Overall, basin precipitation variability and basin runoff are important variables that affect 
treaty cooperation, both the likelihood for forming treaties, and the number of treaties signed.  As 
expected, in all regressions both precipitation and runoff have an inverted U-shape relationship 
on treaty cooperation.   
The various democracy/governance variables (both in index and dummy forms) indicate 
the positive role democracy plays in encouraging transboundary cooperation between states.  The 
dummy forms performed better than the index from definitions and were more significant.   
Geography, an important variable in the study of international water, did not provide 
significant results in any of the estimates.  This is against expectations, although several previous 
studies reviewed earlier suggest similar results.  A possible explanation for this performance of 
the geography variable is that the runoff variability already captures the geography embedded in 
the river basin, and that precipitation distribution between the two riparians is independent of the 
geography of the river.  The high correlation that was found between the precipitation falling on 
the basin area in country 1 and that in country 2, irrespective of the geography of the river could 
support the insignificance of the Geography coefficients. 
Trade is the most robust variable in the analysis and was significant with the expected 
signs in all regressions.  As noted, trade has a hill shaped impact on cooperation.  There are 
several explanations for the hill-shaped behavior of the trade variavble.  First, trade among the 
basin riparians may not be as effective at various levels.  This supports findings by some studies 
(e.g. de Vries 1990 and Barbieri 2002), that find that trade can lead to conflict as well given the 
high interdependence it fosters. And second, riparian states may explore other means and other   
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domains to extrapolate their economic activities beyond the basin such as through trade relations 
with other states in basins that face lower water supply variability..   
The Diplomatic relations variable behaves as expected, suggesting a positive and highly 
significant relationship with treaty cooperation in all regressions.  The variable measuring 
economic power asymmetries in the basin is also negative and highly significant in all 
regressions.  Power asymmetries impede cooperation no matter if the economically strong state 
is upstream or downstream.  Interestingly this finding negates other statistical studies. Tir and 
Ackerman (2009) find that power asymmetries are conducive to treaty formation while Espey 
and Towfique (2004) find that power asymmetries are insignificant for treaty formation.  The 
policy implications of these findings are presented in the concluding section of the paper. 
Marginal impacts 
Calculations of marginal impacts of the main variables on treaty cooperation are presented in 
Table 4.  We present results for regression estimates from Table 3 only.  Values in panels (1)-(4) 
are for estimates with precipitation and values in panels (5)-(8) are for estimates with runoff.   
The interpretation of the coefficients is as follows: An increase of 1 millimeter per year in 
long-term annual precipitation will lead to an increase of between 1-2 treaties.  An increase in 
the long-term runoff of 1 m
3/s will lead to an increase of between 3-5 treaties.  An increase in the 
trade importance, measured as the ratio between trade and GDP of the basin states, in 1 percent, 
will lead to an increase of between 1-14 treaties.  An increase in the status of diplomatic ties 
between the riparian states will lead to an increase of between 1-3 treaties.  And an increase of 1 
percent in the ratio of economic power between the basin states will lead to a very small decrease 
in the number of treaties signed. 
7. Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Future Research 
Views in the extant literature, including the IPCC, raise concerns that “One major implication of 
climate change for agreements between competing users (within a region or upstream versus 
downstream) is that allocating rights in absolute terms may lead to further disputes in years to 
come when the total absolute amount of water available may be different.” (IPCC, 2001: Section 
4.7.3).  Indeed, having an appropriate treaty arrangement that does not confront climate impacts 
such as increased variability may lead to increased likelihood of disputes.  However, what our   
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paper argues is that climate change affects not only the variability of precipitation and runoff, but 
also the interest of riparian states in international rivers to look for solutions to these phenomena 
by altering existing treaties and by signing new treaties among the basin riparian states.   
  Using a set of variables traditionally used in economic and international relations 
literature on international cooperation, we are also able to make some prescriptive suggestions as 
to how to increase cooperation in times of climate change: strengthen democracy and governance 
in the basin states and develop basin integration activities such as trade, stable diplomatic 
relations, and economic development in order to reduce economic power asymmetry and to 
increase basin harmonization.  While there is not much new in this message, it comes with a 
quantitative demonstration and with the connotation of climate change impact on cooperation.  
  While our work provides a first attempt at looking into the relationship between climate 
change and treaty cooperation, it is certainly far from being complete.  Additional analyses could 
benefit from inclusion of the treaty institutions, and especially those related to past water 
allocation regimes, as a possible response to increased water variability.  We also plan on 
extrapolating the functions by introducing predicted values for precipitation and runoff into the 
time horizon for which Global Circulation Models (GCMs) calculate future precipitation and 
temperature as affected by future climate change.  And finally, some of our present variables are 
still at the state level rather than at the basin level.  The interaction between local, basin-level, 
and state-level variables (e.g., GDP, population) would add an important dimension to the 
analysis (Milner 1997).     
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Table 1: Water supply variability impact on treaty likelihood and cooperation 
Dataset Specifications  All Rivers 
Dependent Variable  Number of treaties Treaty/No Treaty  Number of treaties 
Estimation Procedure  GLM 
(1) 
Logit 
(2) 
GLM 
(3) 
CV Basin Precipitation  0.398* 
(1.67) 
  
CV Basin Precipitation 
squared 
-0.216* 
(-1.74) 
  
CV Basin Runoff   
 
6.781*** 
(3.17) 
3.240*** 
(2.87) 
CV Basin Runoff squared   -4.238*** 
(-2.96) 
-1.538*** 
(-3.11) 
Constant 1.110** 
(2.05) 
-1.017** 
(-2.11) 
0.455* 
(1.74) 
No. of Observations  215  220  220 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  -409.40    -412.37 
Log Likelihood    -140.28   
Pseudo R
2   0.044   
Wald χ
2   12.95***   
Maddala R
2 0.284    0.295 
In parentheses are t-values. *** (p<0.01); ** (p<0.05); * (p<0.10). 
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Table 2: Likelihod of treaty formation 
Dataset 
Specifications 
All Rivers 
Dependent 
Variable 
Treaty / No Treaty 
Estimation 
Procedure 
Logit 
(1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Logit 
(3) 
Logit 
(4) 
Logit 
(5) 
Logit 
(6) 
CV Basin 
Precipitation 
3.426* 
(1.87) 
2.902* 
(1.86) 
2.433* 
(1.79) 
   
CV Basin 
Precipitation 
squared 
-0.879* 
(-1.76) 
-0.630* 
(-1.69) 
-0.471* 
(-1.61) 
   
CV Basin Runoff       7.066** 
(1.96) 
6.577* 
(1.73) 
5.355 
(1.50) 
CV Basin Runoff 
squared 
     -3.337* 
(-1.67) 
-2.909 
(-1.39) 
-2.398 
(-1.20) 
VoiceIND1  0.621* 
(1.76) 
   0.743** 
(2.07) 
  
VoiceIND2  -0.430 
(-1.10) 
   -5.624 
(-1.34) 
  
FreedomIND1   -0.212** 
(-2.27) 
   -0.256*** 
(-2.56) 
 
FreedomIND2   0.259** 
(2.17) 
   0.305** 
(2.39) 
 
PolityIND1     0.113** 
(1.92) 
   0.117** 
(2.08) 
PolityIND2     -0.106 
(-1.47) 
   -0.124 
(-1.59) 
Through-border   -0.056 
(-0.12) 
-0.097 
(-0.20) 
-0.036 
(-0.08) 
-0.083 
(-0.18) 
-0.142 
(-0.31) 
-0.019 
(-0.04) 
Border-creator   -0.811 
(-0.75) 
-0.880 
(-0.86) 
-0.622 
(-0.51) 
-1.119 
(-1.23) 
-1.117 
(-1.20) 
-0.857 
(-0.76) 
Trade importance   63.940*** 
(3.09) 
82.189*** 
(3.14) 
55.687*** 
(3.68) 
62.180*** 
(3.23) 
79.377*** 
(3.31) 
55.813*** 
(3.18) 
Trade importance 
squared 
-221.88*** 
(-3.51) 
-273.76*** 
(-3.41) 
-195.479*** 
(-3.68) 
-215.24*** 
(-3.27) 
-263.54*** 
(-3.58) 
-194.33*** 
(-3.54) 
Diplomatic 
relations 
4.204** 
(2.00) 
5.155*** 
(2.62) 
4.492*** 
(2.51) 
3.880 
(1.41) 
4.799** 
(2.11) 
4.268** 
(2.09) 
Economic power  -0.002** 
(-1.72) 
-0.002* 
(-1.65) 
-0.002** 
(-1.96) 
-0.002** 
(-2.00) 
-0.002** 
(-1.96) 
-0.002** 
(-2.21) 
Constant -4.854** 
(-1.98) 
-5.794*** 
(-2.35) 
-4.435** 
(-1.88) 
-4.360* 
(-1.64) 
-5.397** 
(-2.28) 
-4.039** 
(-2.07) 
No. of 
Observations 
128 128  126  131 131 129 
Log Pseudo 
Likelihood 
-60.43 -59.25  -58.89  -60.45 -59.15 -59.73 
Wald χ
2 37.65***  38.02***  36.29***  38.59***  39.96***  36.77*** 
Pseudo R
2 0.239  0.254  0.236  0.257  0.273  0.244 
In parentheses are t-values. *** (p<0.01); ** (p<0.05); * (p<0.10).  
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Table 3: Cooperation estimates applied to the full data set (Poisson and Normal distributions) 
Dataset Specifications  All rivers 
Dependent Variable  Number of treaties 
Estimation Procedure  GLM 
(1) 
GLM 
(2) 
POISSON 
(3) 
POISSON 
(4) 
GLM 
(5) 
GLM 
(6) 
POISSON 
(7) 
POISSON 
(8) 
CV Basin Precipitation  3.984** 
(1.95) 
3.229* 
(1.70) 
2.307** 
1.95) 
1.512*** 
(2.65) 
     
CV Basin Precipitation squared  -1.454* 
(-1.64) 
-0.932 
(-1.16) 
-0.797 
(-1.53) 
-0.324** 
(-2.15) 
     
CV Basin Runoff         6.491*** 
(2.69) 
6.864*** 
(2.89) 
4.662*** 
(3.40) 
3.997*** 
(3.14) 
CV Basin Runoff squared         -3.354** 
(-2.18) 
-3.120** 
(-2.10) 
-2.510*** 
(-2.80) 
-1.667** 
(-1.99) 
PolityLowDUM1   -1.737*** 
(-4.04) 
 -1.111*** 
(-3.34) 
 -1.792*** 
(-4.68) 
 -1.224*** 
(-4.27) 
PolityLowDUM2   0.679* 
(1.71) 
 0.516 
(1.47) 
 0.983** 
(2.08) 
 0.585 
(1.50) 
PolityMedDUM1   -1.490*** 
(-4.20) 
 -1.258*** 
(-4.03) 
 -1.698*** 
(-4.82) 
 -1.553*** 
(-4.43) 
PolityMedDUM2   -0.108 
(-0.36) 
 -0.350 
(-1.03) 
 -0.393 
(-0.78) 
 -0.489 
-1.21 
FreedomIND1  -0.097 
(-1.40) 
     -0.110* 
(-1.78) 
    
FreedomIND2  -0.025 
(-0.28) 
     -0.028 
(-0.29) 
    
PolityIND1     0.063*** 
(2.85) 
    0.063*** 
(2.85) 
 
PolityIND2     0.006 
(0.24) 
    0.026 
(0.78) 
 
Through-border  -0.226 
(-0.76) 
-0.307 
(-0.98) 
-0.178 
(-0.91) 
-0.214 
(-1.10) 
-0.259 
(-0.90) 
-0.338 
(-1.14) 
-0.243 
(-1.24) 
-0.279 
(-1.48) 
Border-creator  0.456 
(0.55) 
0.620 
(0.80) 
0.263 
(0.66) 
0.390 
(1.14) 
0.224 
(0.28) 
0.383 
(0.48) 
0.064 
(0.16) 
0.191 
(0.52) 
Trade importance 20.012** 
(12.03) 
17.605** 
(1.95) 
.048*** 
(2.54) 
7.151** 
(2.28) 
16.451** 
(1.96) 
13.923** 
(2.02) 
5.291* 
(1.81) 
2.666 
(0.90) 
Trade importance squared  -73.537*** 
(-2.48) 
-65.510*** 
(-2.39) 
-35.128*** 
(-3.02) 
--32.430*** 
(-2.80) 
-61.876*** 
(-2.43) 
-52.505*** 
(-2.46) 
-26.637** 
(-2.33) 
-18.240 
(-1.58) 
Diplomatic relations  2.067*** 
(2.54) 
2.481*** 
(3.12) 
1.295* 
(1.83) 
1.564*** 
(2.45) 
1.308 
(1.41) 
1.928*** 
(2.40) 
0.822 
(0.90) 
1.074* 
(1.62) 
Economic power  -0.001*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.38) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.43) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.016*** 
(-4.42) 
-0.002** 
(-2.28) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.38) 
Constant --1.521 
(-1.13) 
-1.915 
(-1.38) 
-2.269** 
(-2.29) 
-1.531 
(-1.55) 
-0.348 
-(0.36) 
-1.36* 
(-1.65) 
-1.928** 
(-2.17) 
-1.156* 
(-1.81) 
No. Of Observations  128  126  126  126  131  129  129  129 
Log  Pseudo  Likelihood  -246.64  -239.05  -200.05 -194.03 -248.69 -239.04  -197.95 -189.95 
Maddala R
2  0.351  0.325     0.374 0.372     
Wald χ
2      63.81***  82.22***    90.81***  147.76*** 
Pseudo R
2      0.138  0.164    0.161  0.195 
In parentheses are t-values. *** (p<0.01); ** (p<0.05); * (p<0.10).   
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Table 4: Marginal values of main variables calculated at the sample mean (using results of estimates in Table 3) 
 
Dataset Specifications  All rivers 
Dependent Variable  Number of treaties 
Estimation Procedure  GLM 
(1) 
GLM 
(2) 
POISSON 
(3) 
POISSON 
(4) 
GLM 
(5) 
GLM 
(6) 
POISSON 
(7) 
POISSON 
(8) 
CV Basin Precipitation  1.719  1.778  1.065  1.08     
CV Basin Runoff         4.260 4.789 2.993 2.887 
Trade importance  14.303  12.519  5.320 4.633 11.64 9.847  3.22 1.250 
Diplomatic relations  2.067 2.481  1.695 1.950 1.308 1.928 1.022 1.263 
Economic power  -0.001 -0.001  -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.016 -0.002 -0.003 
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Appendix 1: Maps 
 
 
Map 1 : Distribution of bilateral basins used in our study 
 
 
Map 2 : Karasu basin delineated by HydroSHEDS data: where red is the basin, blue is the 
accumulation flow grid > 400, green dot is the outflow point, dashed black line is the 
international boundary, and brown circle is a place name. 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics of variables included in the regression analyses  
Variable  Unit Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max  Obs. 
Border-creator  Dummy 0.068  0.252  0  1  220 
Diplomatic relations  Dummy 0.877  0.167  0  1  183 
Economic power  Ratio 207.676  2032.176  1.06  25995.83  164 
Number of treaties  Integer 1.25 1.61  0.00  10.00  220 
Through-border   Dummy 0.45 0.498  0  1  226 
Trade dependency   Percent 0.037  0.062  9.89e-05 0.243  214 
Trade importance   Percent 0.038  0.089  1.49e-05 0.315  169 
Treaty/no-treaty  0/1 0.61  0.488  0  1  220 
Country 1 Freedom ind  Index 6.28  3.58 2 14  220 
Country 2 Freedom ind  Index 6.35  3.77 2 14  220 
Country 1 Polity ind  Index 5.32  5.62  -9 10  217 
Country 2 Polity ind  Index 4.83  6.10  -9 10  217 
Country 1 Voice ind  Index 0.267  0.939  -1.78  1.69  220 
Country 2 Voice ind  Index -0.222  1.01  -1.75 1.69  220 
Basin Precipitation mean  mm/year 964.10  712.35  26.80 3110.15  215 
Basin Precipitation CV  Ratio 0.778  0.340  0.264  2.23  215 
Basin Runoff mean  m
3/s 1014.53  3520.36  0.389  37434.13  220 
Basin Runoff CV  Ratio 0.332  0.272  0.086  2.45  220 
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Appendix 3: Sources to identify non-TFDD basin locations 
The following table lists the sources of basins that are not included in the TFDD and were 
delineated for this analysis using information from the given sources accessed in 2009 and 
HydroSHEDS, except for Tobol, which did not have sufficient geographical coverage; so 
Hydro1k was used.  
 
RIVER Source 
ALLAINE http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allaine  
ARGUN http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argun_River_(Asia)   
BELLI DRIM  http://www.inweb.gr/workshops/sub_basins/8_Drin.html  
BERMEJO http://www.hidricosargentina.gov.ar/estad2004/sus-ju-sa-tuc.htm  
BOJANA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bojana_River   
BULGAN 
http://www.welcome2mongolia.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/maps_physical-
map-of-mongolia1.jpg  
CAROL http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/COU-143747E.pdf  
CHANZA 
Grande J.A. et al. "Comparative of acid drainage process types between two 
streams of the Cobica river in the environment of the Iberian Pyrite Belt (Huelva, 
Spain) and impact on the Andévalo Dam."  
http://www.imwa.info/docs/imwa_2005/IMWA2005_016_Grande.pdf 
CHU 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chu_River; 
http://www.advantour.com/img/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-map-mid.jpg;  
CHUT DE CHATELOT 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PUB/Documents/IR-05-007.ps; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doubs_River;  
DESNA (SMOLENSKA) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desna_River; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dnepr_Basin_River_Town_German.png;  
DOVERIA 
Rouiller and Joris, 2000, "L’ovaille de Gondo" ; Murray, J, 1905, "Handbook for 
Switzerland and the Adjacent Regions of the Alps" p 190;  
DUVERIJ (DOVEYRICH)  http://www.traveljournals.net/explore/iraq/map/m4384670/nahr_ad_duwayrij.html  
EGER (OHRE)  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohre  
GADA/ GOULBI  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goulbi_de_Maradi_river  
GANDAK http://www.mapsofworld.com/nepal/nepal-river-map.html  
GANDER http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gander_(french_river)  
GANGIR http://water.worldcitydb.com/kangir_4388238.aspx   
GRANDE DE TARIJA  http://www.hidricosargentina.gov.ar/estad2004/sus-ju-sa-tuc.htm  
HAL HA 
http://www.welcome2mongolia.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/maps_physical-
map-of-mongolia1.jpg  
HERMANCE 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermance_(river); 
herm_PD_ANIERES_DOC1_chap8.pdf;  
JUDRIO 
http://www.natisoneinbici.it; http://www.wein-
plus.com/italy/Collio+DOC_B6141.html;  
KANJAN CHAM 
Ali, Mukdad, "Transboundary waterways and streams along the Iraq-Iran border 
lines… the reality and future"  
KARASU 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/622548/Lake-Van; Lippincott's New 
Gazetteer; International Boundary Study - Iran – Turkey Boundary  1963 
KERULEN http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kherlen_River   
KOMADOUGOU-YOBE http://water.worldcitydb.com/   
KOOTENAY http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kootenai_River   
KOSI http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosi_River   
KURICHHU 
http://www.brahmatwinn.uni-
jena.de/brahmatwinnwiki/uploads/3/3a/3_Sherab_Tashi_Hydropower.pdf; 
http://www.lonelyplanet.com/shop_pickandmix/previews/bhutan-3-eastern-bhutan-
preview.pdf;  
LATORICA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latorica_River   
MAHAKALI (Pencheshwar 
Project) 
http://csmrs.gov.in/ar_03.html; 
http://www.traveljournals.net/explore/india/map/m2929559/sarju_river.html;  
MAHAKALI (SARADA )  http://www.mapsofworld.com/nepal/nepal-river-map.html;   
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarda_River;  
MAHAKALI 
(TANKAPUR PROJECT) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarda_River; 
http://www.uttaranchalirrigation.com/hydro/commission/tanakpur.htm;  
MAIR (MERA)  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mera_River  
MELEZZA http://water.worldcitydb.com/   
MILK http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milk_River_(Montana-Alberta)  
MONT CENIS  http://www.gutenberg.org/files/24787/24787-h/images/map291.png  
NEGRO http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Río_Negro_(Uruguay)   
NEW http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_River_(California)   
NIAGARA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niagara_River  
OLSA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olza_River  
ONON 
http://www.welcome2mongolia.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/maps_physical-
map-of-mongolia1.jpg; wikipedia;  
ORAWA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orava_River   
PETRUVKA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petruvka_River  
PRUT http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prut_River   
QURAI/CURAIM http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quaraí_River  
RENO DE LEI  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lago_di_Lei  
ROYA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roya_River   
SAAR http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_River   
SALZACH http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salzach   
SARISU http://water.worldcitydb.com/   
SEIM (KURSKA)  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seym_River  
SELENGA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selenga  
SEVERSKY DONETS  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seversky_Donets  
SIRET http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siret_River   
SOURIS http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Souris_River   
SPOL 
http://www.gramene.org/db/ontology/search?id=149514; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spöl;  
ST. MARY 
http://www.chrs.ca/Rivers/StMarys/StMarys-F_e.htm; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Mary_River;  
TAGWAI/EL FADAMA  http://water.worldcitydb.com/  
TEESTA 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tista_River; 
http://www.sandrp.in/rivers/Teesta_River_flowing_through_tunnels_Apr2008.jpg;  
TIB (MEHMEH) 
Ali, Mukdad, "Transboundary waterways and streams along the Iraq-Iran border 
lines… the reality and future"; Lawrence G. Potter "The Evolution of the Iran-Iraq 
Boundary" Chapter 4;  
TIMOK http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timok_River   
TOBOL http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tobol_River   
TORRENTE BREGGIA  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breggia; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lake_Como;  
TUNDZHA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tundzha  
USSURI http://water.worldcitydb.com/ussuri_river_2691300.html  
UZH http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzh_River   
WANGCHU 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/field/003/P8793E/P8793E02.jpg; 
http://www.brahmatwinn.uni-
jena.de/brahmatwinnwiki/uploads/3/3a/3_Sherab_Tashi_Hydropower.pdf;  
WITKA/SMEDA http://water.worldcitydb.com/   
YAGUARON/JAGUARAO http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaguarão_River  
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Endnotes 
                                                            
i In this paper we analyze only bilateral treaties.  The analysis of multilateral treaties necessitates a different set of 
assumptions regarding the interactions among (N>2) riparian states.  The inclusion of multilateral basins in the 
analysis will take place in a future study. 
ii HydroSHEDS is a dataset in the public domain of conditioned Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) 
elevation data (90m resolution) that used a series of processing steps that alter the elevation values in order to 
produce a surface that drains to the coast (except in cases of known internal drainages). Further steps include 
filtering, lowering of stream courses and adjacent pixels, and carving out barriers to streamflow. Flow accumulation 
and flow direction grids (30 arc seconds) were downloaded at: 
http://gisdata.usgs.net/Website/HydroSHEDS/viewer.php. 
iii http://cru.csi.cgiar.org/ 
iv In a future study we plan incorporating GIS overlays to estimate the proportion of GDP in the part of a basin of the 
country (static variable) that uses spatially disaggregated GDP data based on sub-national data at the World Bank 
(for 2000). 
v International Freshwater Treaties Database, Oregon State University; League of Nations Treaty Series; United 
Nations Treaty Series; United States Treaties in Force; Food and Agriculture Organization (1978; 1984);  Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAOLEX and WATERLEX); United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE, 2003); French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Repertorio Cronológico de Legislación (Spain); Central Asia 
Regional Water, Environment, and Energy Agreements, Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Texas; 
International Water Law Project; Parry (1969); Rohn (1984). 
vi Future analysis could identify the number of known floods or droughts in recent history by basin based on UNEP / 
WB, UNISDR report, and Dartmouth Observatory data: http://www.grid.unep.ch/activities/earlywarning/preview/   
and http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/report/index.php?id=1130&pid:34&pih:2 and 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~floods/ 
vii On a technical note, relationships based on (4) will be estimated using Logit procedures, while relationships based 
on (5) will be estimated using GLM or Poisson procedures. For the reader needing more details please refer to 
Maddala (1983).  For equations with Treaty/no-treaty, values of the independent variable are 0/1 and a Logit 
procedure was used; for Number of treaties, values are in the range of 0-10 and a Poisson and GLM procedures are 
used. 
viii We should note that due to missing values of several variables, we end up with a set of about 128-132 
observations only.  In our next stage of the research we will amend the missing data. 